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A
mAbstract
In the early days of transition Poland hosted regional earning disparities. Low levels
of worker and firm mobility allow us to threat regions as local labor markets. Wage
behavior is modeled in regional labor markets as an outcome of the speed of
transition examining employment restructuring in labor demand. The local short-
term unemployment (excessive layoffs) rate elasticity of pay is estimated as −0.29
and the local annual hiring rate elasticity of pay as + 0.75, controlling for individual
characteristics and selection, amongst other factors. While individual characteristics
determine participation rates and where one is on the wage distribution within
regions, employment restructuring accounts for most of the mean earning disparities
across regions.
Journal of Economic Literature: Classification Numbers J6, L0 and O5.
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“If several workmen were to be asked: ‘How much wages do you get?’ one would reply,
‘I get two shillings a day’, and so on. According to the different branches of industry
in which they are employed, they would mention different sums of money that they
receive from their respective employers for the completion of a certain task; for
example, for weaving a yard of linen, or for setting a page of type. Despite the variety
of their statements, they would all agree upon one point: that wages are the amount
of money which the capitalist pays for a certain period of work or for a certain
amount of work; it is the capitalist who determines wages.” (Marx, 1933 pp17)Introduction
At the start of transition, labor market conditions were characterized by full employment
of the working age population in inefficient enterprises across oversized industrial and
agricultural sectors. In moving to a market economy many researchers anticipated unpre-
cedented worker reallocation. The expansion of services and downsizing of manufactur-
ing and agriculture would have to be facilitated by worker reallocation. In addition, the
downsizing, exit and entry of enterprises within sectors would also have to be accommo-
dated by further worker reallocation. Aghion and Blanchard (1994), present us with a
model of wage setting within an Optimal Speed of Transition (OST) model of worker
reallocation.1 The government dictates the optimal speed at which workers are released
from non-restructured enterprises.2 To increase the speed of absorption of labor into the2012 Walsh and Burke; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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sure on wages. The extent to which unemployment can be used is constrained by hav-
ing unemployment benefits financed out of labor taxes. Unemployment levels can
determine the speed of labor reallocation. The model predicts an optimal layoff rate in
each period that maximizes the hiring rate in restructured enterprises. Average pay in a
labor market is predicted to be negatively related to the unemployment (excessive layoffs)
rate and positively related to the annual hiring rate. Their theoretical model relates the level
of pay to the speed of worker reallocation. The pace of employment restructuring should
be a key determinant of the mean wage, amongst other factors 3. This theory is tested
across forty-nine local Polish labor markets during the early phase of transition.
This paper conducts individual regressions, assuming individual pay does not dictate
regional annual worker reallocation, and estimates the, on average, impact of the speed
of transition on pay, controlling for a rich set of individual characteristics and the selection
process into employment, among other factors. To show the appropriateness of this
approach several questions are addressed; Is it right to threat Polish regions as local labor
markets? Was there a regional variation in short-term unemployment and hiring rates
across regions in early transition? and finally, Was there a regional disparity in mean
pay during early transition?
The lack of inter-regional worker and job flows during transition is well documented
for Poland. Deichmann and Henderson (2000) document increasing wage differentials and
persistent differentials in unemployment rates across regions, even amongst neighboring
regions in Poland during the period 1990–1998. One might have expected migration flows
to increase dramatically during transition, but a dramatic slowdown is documented. They
put forward housing shortages as a key deterrent of migration. The absence of migration
flows ensures that the authors do not have to concern ourselves with the standard Harris-
Todaro critique, the need to model migration as a key labor supply determinant of regional
wage levels. In addition, inter-regional job flows have been virtually absent during transi-
tion (see Faggio and Konings, 2003). Firm migration has not been a key feature of re-
gional labor demand. It is assumed assume that workers and firms are locked into local
labor markets during the period of our analysis, 1994–1996 4.
Why should the optimal speed of worker reallocation be expected to differ across
local labor markets in Poland? Local labor markets in Poland inherited very idiosyn-
cratic employment structures coming out of planning that have persisted. While most
regions, by western standards, had a narrow range of employment activities, some east-
ern regions were extremely specialized. This is apparent in Table 1, which documents
the regional concentration of employment by 2-digit sectors (shown in annex 1). The
C1 concentration ratio illustrates that the biggest 2-digit sectors can account for as
much as 60 per cent of total regional employment, while the C5, top five 2-digit sectors,
accounts for the vast majority of regional employment. As a result of such initial conditions
in employment structure the optimal speed of transition did differ across labor markets 5.
In Table 2 the gaps in annual short-term unemployment (excessive layoffs) and hiring rates
relative to Warsaw are documented. Such regional disparities in annual worker flows should
reflect the speed of ongoing regional restructuring (or lack off) of traditional enterprises
and the expansion (or lack off) of new enterprises.
Finally regional disparities in mean pay are examined. In the first two columns of
Table 3 the mean monthly wage (thousands of Polish Zloty) across regions calculated
Table 1 Concentration ratios of employment into the top1, 2, 5 and 10 2-digit sectors
(Average 1994–1996)
Region C1 C2 C5 C10
Bialostockie 48 59 81 93
Bialskopodlaskie 34 48 71 84
Bielskie 14 23 47 69
Bydgoskie 16 28 51 74
Chelmskie 44 53 71 92
Ciechanowskie 45 54 72 88
Czestochowskie 20 31 56 75
Elblaskie 17 29 54 79
Gdanskie 16 30 60 80
Gorzowskie 14 28 54 78
Jeleniogorskie 14 26 52 74
Kaliskie 29 38 60 80
Katowickie 33 44 66 81
Kieleekie 41 49 70 83
Koninskie 26 38 65 84
Koszalinskie 16 27 55 83
Krakowskie 21 37 64 81
Krosnienskie 18 34 51 71
Legnickie 18 33 63 82
Leszezynskie 21 35 64 85
Lodzkie 36 45 67 84
Lomzynskie 56 63 79 92
Lubelskie 16 29 52 75
Nowosadeckie 43 53 71 86
Olsztynskie 20 39 51 82
Opolskie 16 27 51 73
Ostroleckie 42 51 72 87
Pilskie 17 29 57 73
Piotrkowskie 31 43 62 82
Plockie 35 44 65 84
Poznanskie 13 24 49 75
Premyskie 34 45 64 83
Radomskie 35 44 62 81
Rzeszowskie 32 44 66 83
Siedleckie 40 49 68 84
Sieradzkie 40 54 67 83
Skierniewickie 31 43 63 86
Slupskie 13 28 52 81
Suwalskie 34 44 65 86
Szezecinskie 15 30 57 79
Tarnobrzeskie 42 50 69 86
Tarnowskie 38 48 67 85
Torunskie 23 34 57 81
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Table 1 Concentration ratios of employment into the top1, 2, 5 and 10 2-digit sectors
(Average 1994–1996) (Continued)
Walbrzyskie 11 21 46 70
Warszawskie 21 34 57 78
Wloclawskie 50 58 71 89
Wroclawskie 14 26 53 72
Zamojskie 60 66 78 92
Zielonogorskie 13 24 48 76
(Source: Calculations based on Polish LFS).
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understand how representative the LFS data is the authors document the mean
monthly wage across regions taken from Polish regional yearbooks 6. Even though the
level of wages is higher in official data, the trends over-time and across regions are
similar. It is observed that the gap between pay in regions relative to Warsaw is persist-
ent. On average, pay outside Warsaw is 30 per cent lower.
The main aim of this paper is to explain regional disparity in mean pay during early tran-
sition. Motivated by Aghion and Blanchard (1994) the authors consider the role of un-
employment and hiring rates across regions as a determinant of regional pay disparities,
controlling for a rich set of individual characteristics and the selection process into em-
ployment, amongst other factors. Using this strategy the local short-term unemployment
(excessive layoffs) and annual hiring rate elasticity of individual pay is estimated to be
approximately −0.29 and +0.75, respectively. Large regional variation in short-term
unemployment and hiring rates ensure that the speed of transition explains most of the
disparity in average earnings across regions. Yet, individual characteristics are important
for participation and where one is on the wage distribution within regions.
I. Wage behavior during transition
The model in this section is the basic labor reallocation model of Aghion and Blanchard
(1994), as illustrated in Roland (2000). The labor force in a labor market is normalized to
1. The number of workers in restructured firms in date t is NR(t), the number of workers
in an non-restructured state at date t is NNR(t), and the number of unemployed job
searchers at date t is U(t).
NR tð Þ þ NNR tð Þ þ U tð Þ ¼ 1 ð1Þ
The objective of the government is to decide on the optimal number of worker flowsfrom the non-restructured state in each time period, dN*NR(t)/dt, in full anticipation of
the factors that determine the speed of reallocation 7. Increases in employment in
restructured firms in date t, dNR(t)/dt, is determined by the following equation,
dNR tð Þ
dt
¼ δ 1 w tð Þ þ z tð Þð Þ½  ð2Þ
The marginal revenue product of labor is normalized to 1. The marginal cost of labor
is made up of a wage rate, w(t), and a tax, z(t), in time t levied on wages to finance
unemployment benefits. The value of δ is the scale of operation of the restructured sector.
This determines how many workers are employed in time t given the mark-up on one unit
Table 2 Persistent gaps in annual STU and hiring rates across regions
Annual STU Rate Relative to Warsaw Annual Hiring Rate Relative to Warsaw
Labor Force Survey Labor Force Survey Labor Force Survey Labor Force Survey
Regions 1994 1995 1996 1994 1995 1996 1994 1995 1996 1994 1995 1996
Bialostockie 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.98 1.09 1.59 0.12 0.16 0.18 0.52 0.64 0.76
Bialskopodlaskie 0.05 0.05 0.05 1.15 1.32 1.71 0.18 0.15 0.19 0.75 0.61 0.79
Bielskie 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.97 1.19 1.46 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.98 0.91 0.86
Bydgoskie 0.08 0.09 0.07 1.85 2.28 2.28 0.19 0.20 0.24 0.79 0.84 0.97
Chelmskie 0.06 0.04 0.06 1.28 0.93 1.97 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.72 0.51 0.70
Ciechanowskie 0.06 0.07 0.07 1.37 1.59 2.16 0.20 0.24 0.21 0.85 0.97 0.86
Czestochowskie 0.09 0.04 0.06 2.03 0.99 2.12 0.13 0.19 0.24 0.55 0.76 0.99
Elblaskie 0.09 0.09 0.03 2.04 2.12 1.03 0.24 0.21 0.29 1.00 0.86 1.19
Gdanskie 0.06 0.05 0.05 1.35 1.27 1.63 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.92 1.03 1.02
Gorzowskie 0.13 0.09 0.09 2.83 2.13 2.98 0.19 0.25 0.32 0.79 1.04 1.31
Jeleniogorskie 0.08 0.13 0.09 1.73 3.13 3.09 0.23 0.26 0.27 0.98 1.07 1.13
Kaliskie 0.06 0.06 0.06 1.25 1.41 2.02 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.80 0.70 0.74
Katowickie 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.92 0.71 1.12 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.67 0.76 0.69
Kieleekie 0.06 0.07 0.05 1.30 1.59 1.56 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.63 0.68 0.72
Koninskie 0.07 0.06 0.09 1.60 1.44 2.90 0.13 0.12 0.20 0.56 0.50 0.81
Koszalinskie 0.11 0.12 0.13 2.50 3.03 4.37 0.29 0.28 0.25 1.23 1.16 1.02
Krakowskie 0.05 0.05 0.03 1.06 1.14 1.01 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.82 0.71 0.78
Krosnienskie 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.62 2.23 1.87 0.22 0.16 0.17 0.93 0.65 0.71
Legnickie 0.08 0.08 0.05 1.76 1.91 1.64 0.15 0.14 0.22 0.63 0.59 0.89
Leszezynskie 0.09 0.05 0.05 1.93 1.26 1.50 0.14 0.24 0.23 0.58 1.00 0.93
Lodzkie 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.97 1.37 1.74 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.70 0.60 0.76
Lomzynskie 0.05 0.06 0.04 1.01 1.49 1.46 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.74 0.60 0.72
Lubelskie 0.09 0.09 0.07 2.06 2.20 2.16 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.88 0.90 0.86
Nowosadeckie 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.98 1.18 2.70 0.15 0.17 0.22 0.62 0.69 0.90
Olsztynskie 0.10 0.09 0.09 2.22 2.20 3.07 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.98 0.92 0.91
Opolskie 0.05 0.06 0.04 1.08 1.40 1.45 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.81 0.89 0.80
Ostroleckie 0.09 0.10 0.05 1.91 2.37 1.56 0.20 0.17 0.23 0.84 0.69 0.94
Pilskie 0.10 0.08 0.06 2.26 2.01 1.94 0.23 0.20 0.25 0.98 0.82 1.03
Piotrkowskie 0.08 0.05 0.07 1.85 1.33 2.24 0.16 0.20 0.17 0.66 0.81 0.71
Plockie 0.06 0.06 0.06 1.42 1.51 1.85 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.85 0.83 0.61
Poznanskie 0.05 0.04 0.04 1.15 1.05 1.42 0.18 0.22 0.19 0.74 0.90 0.79
Premyskie 0.06 0.06 0.05 1.43 1.49 1.78 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.44 0.55 0.61
Radomskie 0.06 0.08 0.05 1.38 1.86 1.82 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.65 0.73 0.66
Rzeszowskie 0.05 0.06 0.07 1.01 1.42 2.21 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.79 0.82 0.89
Siedleckie 0.06 0.05 0.04 1.42 1.15 1.33 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.80 0.76 0.75
Sieradzkie 0.08 0.09 0.04 1.73 2.13 1.36 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.73 0.67 0.72
Skierniewickie 0.10 0.02 0.03 2.18 0.45 0.86 0.17 0.18 0.21 0.72 0.75 0.86
Slupskie 0.18 0.12 0.14 3.94 2.99 4.49 0.19 0.25 0.28 0.81 1.03 1.14
Suwalskie 0.13 0.12 0.11 2.79 2.86 3.65 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.69 0.77 0.86
Szezecinskie 0.11 0.05 0.06 2.38 1.11 2.08 0.21 0.27 0.24 0.86 1.12 1.00
Tarnobrzeskie 0.05 0.06 0.04 1.09 1.54 1.48 0.12 0.17 0.14 0.51 0.70 0.59
Tarnowskie 0.06 0.06 0.03 1.37 1.34 1.07 0.16 0.19 0.24 0.66 0.79 1.00
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Table 2 Persistent gaps in annual STU and hiring rates across regions (Continued)
Torunskie 0.08 0.07 0.08 1.88 1.73 2.74 0.20 0.19 0.22 0.84 0.79 0.88
Walbrzyskie 0.10 0.08 0.10 2.21 1.90 3.27 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.72 0.83 0.84
Warszawskie 0.04 0.04 0.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.24 0.24 0.24 1.00 1.00 1.00
Wloclawskie 0.09 0.11 0.08 1.94 2.68 2.57 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.79 0.63 0.66
Wroclawskie 0.05 0.06 0.06 1.19 1.48 1.85 0.25 0.25 0.25 1.05 1.02 1.02
Zamojskie 0.05 0.06 0.04 1.05 1.34 1.28 0.15 0.16 0.21 0.61 0.65 0.85
Zielonogorskie 0.08 0.11 0.06 1.81 2.75 1.83 0.18 0.24 0.23 0.74 0.99 0.95
Mean 0.07 0.07 0.06 1.62 1.67 2.01 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.77 0.80 0.86
SD 0.028 0.026 0.024 0.622 0.625 0.809 0.037 0.040 0.038 0.157 0.164 0.156
Min 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.62 0.45 0.86 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.44 0.50 0.59
Max 0.18 0.13 0.14 3.94 3.13 4.49 0.29 0.28 0.32 1.23 1.16 1.31
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determine the size of δ. The budget constraint of the government is given by,
bU tð Þ ¼ 1 U tð Þð Þz tð Þ ð3Þ
where b is the per capita level of unemployment benefit that is assumed to be time
invariant. As illustrated in Roland (2000), one can write down asset equations for the
expected discounted (with ρ) income stream from unemployment and from employment
in the restructured sector. Assuming there has to be a constant compensating differential,
c, to induce people out of unemployment into the restructured sector, one can write the
following reduced form expression for wage setting,




The above expression forms the basis of this paper's empirical work 8. Pay is driven
by outside options. In particular, it is negatively related to the unemployment rate (exces-
sive layoffs during period (t) that are effective job searchers) and positively related to the
hiring rate during period (t) in the restructured firms. The variables W(t), dNR(t)/dt, and
U (t) are endogenous outcomes.
The government is assumed to control the optimal number of separations coming
from non-restructured firms, dN*NR(t)/dt, in period t. Market forces will determine the
hiring rate, dNR(t)/dt, and the unemployment rate, U (t). The objective of the government
is to maximize the speed of the reallocation process, by maximizing dNR(t)/dt. Using
equations (1) to (4) one can express dNR(t)/dt as the following,
dNR tð Þ
dt
¼ δU tð Þ
U tð Þ þ cδ 1 ρc
b
1 U tð Þ
 
ð5Þ
In Figure 1, the inverse U relationship between the hiring rate, dNR(t)/dt, and theunemployment rate, U(t) is graphed. Clearly from equation (4) if U(t) = 0, wages would
be infinite and no reallocation can take place. In addition the hiring rate in the restruc-
tured sector is zero when, U(t) = 1 - (b/1-ρc): unemployment is so high that the tax on
employment to finance unemployment benefits reduces the speed of reallocation to
zero. The maximum speed of transition dN*R(t)/dt and associated U*(t) are illustrated
in Figure 1. Knowing dNR(t)/dt and U(t), one can back out the wage level from
Table 3 Persistent gaps in mean monthly wages across regions
Mean Monthly
Wage
Relative to Warsaw Mean Monthly
Wage
Relative to Warsaw
Labor Force Survey Labor Force Survey Regional Yearbook Regional Yearbook
Regions 1994 1995 1996 1994 1995 1996 1994 1995 1996 1994 1995 1996
Bialostockie 333 470 601 0.67 0.66 0.64 449 586 738 0.68 0.67 0.65
Bialskopodlaskie 366 512 669 0.74 0.72 0.72 477 628 784 0.73 0.72 0.69
Bielskie 398 535 764 0.80 0.75 0.82 489 646 808 0.74 0.74 0.71
Bydgoskie 386 582 746 0.78 0.82 0.80 482 634 800 0.73 0.72 0.71
Chelmskie 340 490 718 0.69 0.69 0.77 441 593 748 0.67 0.68 0.66
Ciechanowskie 377 508 681 0.76 0.71 0.73 433 566 713 0.66 0.65 0.63
Czestochowskie 359 502 654 0.72 0.70 0.70 437 585 741 0.67 0.67 0.66
Elblaskie 358 545 657 0.72 0.76 0.70 478 623 802 0.73 0.71 0.71
Gdanskie 436 661 844 0.88 0.93 0.90 522 692 873 0.79 0.79 0.77
Gorzowskie 393 501 709 0.79 0.70 0.76 457 606 757 0.69 0.69 0.67
Jeleniogorskie 432 579 662 0.87 0.81 0.71 513 678 827 0.78 0.77 0.73
Kaliskie 342 495 624 0.69 0.69 0.67 441 577 733 0.67 0.66 0.65
Katowickie 504 683 904 1.01 0.96 0.97 664 860 1061 1.01 0.98 0.94
Kieleekie 353 478 671 0.71 0.67 0.72 459 606 770 0.70 0.69 0.68
Koninskie 422 594 711 0.85 0.83 0.76 565 724 887 0.86 0.83 0.78
Koszalinskie 348 509 717 0.70 0.71 0.77 452 600 746 0.69 0.68 0.66
Krakowskie 435 593 726 0.88 0.83 0.78 509 669 881 0.77 0.76 0.78
Krosnienskie 325 471 631 0.66 0.66 0.68 448 595 747 0.68 0.68 0.66
Legnickie 443 580 765 0.89 0.81 0.82 607 816 1011 0.92 0.93 0.89
Leszezynskie 315 453 634 0.63 0.64 0.68 428 570 724 0.65 0.65 0.64
Lodzkie 392 565 750 0.79 0.79 0.80 494 647 839 0.75 0.74 0.74
Lomzynskie 360 505 650 0.73 0.71 0.70 441 588 751 0.67 0.67 0.66
Lubelskie 410 518 686 0.83 0.73 0.73 479 631 804 0.73 0.72 0.71
Nowosadeckie 336 450 582 0.68 0.63 0.62 425 553 699 0.65 0.63 0.62
Olsztynskie 367 516 699 0.74 0.72 0.75 473 618 775 0.72 0.70 0.69
Opolskie 377 574 802 0.76 0.81 0.86 487 650 825 0.74 0.74 0.73
Ostroleckie 393 492 671 0.79 0.69 0.72 482 645 805 0.73 0.74 0.71
Pilskie 361 522 689 0.73 0.73 0.74 443 379 745 0.67 0.43 0.66
Piotrkowskie 466 524 664 0.94 0.74 0.71 531 676 834 0.81 0.77 0.74
Plockie 440 593 766 0.89 0.83 0.82 535 721 885 0.81 0.82 0.78
Poznanskie 393 523 717 0.79 0.73 0.77 503 669 873 0.77 0.76 0.77
Premyskie 296 421 656 0.60 0.59 0.70 440 583 731 0.67 0.67 0.65
Radomskie 376 472 642 0.76 0.66 0.69 447 589 746 0.68 0.67 0.66
Rzeszowskie 352 495 650 0.71 0.69 0.70 466 618 784 0.71 0.70 0.69
Siedleckie 366 531 702 0.74 0.74 0.75 454 592 740 0.69 0.68 0.65
Sieradzkie 338 446 650 0.68 0.63 0.70 442 573 718 0.67 0.65 0.63
Skierniewickie 378 488 626 0.76 0.69 0.67 439 594 750 0.67 0.68 0.66
Slupskie 379 479 686 0.76 0.67 0.73 432 572 712 0.66 0.65 0.63
Suwalskie 341 510 723 0.69 0.72 0.77 436 579 733 0.66 0.66 0.65
Szezecinskie 444 560 797 0.89 0.79 0.85 539 710 880 0.82 0.81 0.78
Tarnobrzeskie 360 506 685 0.73 0.71 0.73 487 638 805 0.74 0.73 0.71
Tarnowskie 380 503 640 0.77 0.71 0.68 443 610 774 0.67 0.70 0.68
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Table 3 Persistent gaps in mean monthly wages across regions (Continued)
Torunskie 385 527 712 0.78 0.74 0.76 452 604 758 0.69 0.69 0.67
Walbrzyskie 397 498 614 0.80 0.70 0.66 481 616 778 0.73 0.70 0.69
Warszawskie 496 713 934 1.00 1.00 1.00 657 877 1131 1.00 1.00 1.00
Wloclawskie 356 481 583 0.72 0.67 0.62 444 586 749 0.68 0.67 0.66
Wroclawskie 398 593 758 0.80 0.83 0.81 501 659 844 0.76 0.75 0.75
Zamojskie 325 429 610 0.66 0.60 0.65 425 567 718 0.65 0.65 0.64
Zielonogorskie 385 494 648 0.78 0.69 0.69 450 597 742 0.68 0.68 0.66
Mean 382 524 696 0.77 0.73 0.74 479 629 797 0.73 0.72 0.71
SD 44 60 73 0.088 0.084 0.078 54 78 87 0.081 0.089 0.077
Min 296 421 582 0.60 0.59 0.62 425 379 699 0.65 0.43 0.62
Max 504 713 934 1.01 1.00 1.00 664 877 1131 1.01 1.00 1.00
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from equation (1).
The above analysis gives a good economic foundation for why wage levels in period
(t) respond to period (t) (excessive) layoffs and hiring rates (as a percentage of the labor
force, normalized to one). We re-write equation (4) as follows,





 β2 lnUjt þ εjt ð6Þ
Pay in region j is negatively related to the unemployment rate (excessive annual layoffseffective in job search) and positively related to the hiring rate in region j in period t,
among other country (benefit system) and regional j (compensating differentials) specific
determinants. At this level of aggregation one should have a set of proposed instruments
and controls for unobserved regional heterogeneity. The authors' strategy is to model the,
on average, response of individual wages to the local short-term unemployment (excessive
layoffs) rate and the local annual hiring rate, on average, controlling for individual character-
istics and selection to employment. The objective is to see whether the pace of labor
reallocation can account for differences in mean regional wages.
An empirical relationship between the wage level and local unemployment and hiring







0 1 - (b/1-ρc)
Optimal Unemployment and Hiring in the Restructured Sector 
Figure 1 Optimal unemployment and hiring in the restructured sector.
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replaced with a wage setting curve, as in the Aghion and Blanchard (1994), a negative
relationship between pay and the unemployment rate is clearly predicted 10. Motivated by
theories of imperfectly competitive theories of wage setting, many authors provide evidence
that regional pay and unemployment are negatively correlated; Blackaby and Manning
1987, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c using British Data, Freeman (1988) using American data, Card
(1990) using Canadian data and Janssens and Konings (1999) using Belgian data 11.
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) document a negative empirical relationship between
local unemployment and pay determination, which they term a “Wage Curve”. A typical
wage curve is described by the following specification;
lnWit ¼ β0  0:1 lnUjt þ β2Xit þ β2Dj þ β3Dt þ εit ð7Þ
The natural logarithm of individual i in period t hourly/monthly/yearly earnings, Wit,is explained by the natural logarithm of region j unemployment rate, Ujt,, a vector of
workplace and human capital characteristics, Xit,(age, education, work experience and
employment sector), regional and time dummies, Dj, and Dt,, respectively. Regression
results on samples across 12 countries suggest that the unemployment elasticity of pay
approximates −0.1: a hypothetical doubling of unemployment is associated with a drop
in pay of 10%. Using the International Social Survey Programme series from 1991–1997
for nine countries, Blanchflower (2001) estimates wage curves for many CEE countries,
including Poland. The elasticity of pay with respect to unemployment is estimated to be
−0.13 using data on 4,747 individuals across 8 Polish regions. While magnitudes in the
unemployment elasticity of pay vary across countries it seems that transition countries
display more elastic responses 12.
While the authors estimate the relationship between the level of pay and local short-
term unemployment for males across all Polish regions using LFS data, the real
strength of this research is that it is done in the context of imperfectly competitive
wage setting in a labor market in transition, the Aghion and Blanchard (1994) model.
The short-term unemployment rate is used to capture excessive layoffs during an inter-
val of a year, that are active in job search. This excludes the long term unemployed
(LTU). The idea is to include job searchers in unemployment that reduce wage pres-
sure. The aim is to capture the impact of excessive annual layoffs on wage setting in
the context of the Aghion and Blanchard (1994) model 13.
The other side of labor reallocation in the Aghion and Blanchard (1994) model is that
pay should be positively related to the annual hiring rate. Belzil (2000) was the first to
examine the sensitivity of individual pay, to the job creation rate while controlling for
the business cycle with the unemployment rate in the context of an individual country
specific study. Structural change in employment, not captured by business cycle indica-
tors, can be an important “omitted variable” in wage equations.
Section III: Empirical evidence
The Polish LFS is a quarterly household survey. This paper uses three data waves of
the survey, corresponding to the November 1994, 1995 and 1996 waves. The survey
includes individuals older than 15 years and there is no upper age limit. However it
does omit individuals living in military barracks and dormitories, and any household
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tains more than 50 questions and allows one to distinguish between the employed, the
unemployed and those not in the labor force according to ILO/OECD definitions.
Females are intentionally excluded in this study as they have more complex participation
considerations than their male counterparts.
The total number of observations on males is 75,000 over 1994, 1995, and 1996. For
each observation a record of age, type of completed education, regional location (voi-
vodship), sector attachment in the reference week (reporting of sector attachment in
non-employment is poor), tenure of current job, years of work experience, marriage
status, and earnings are used which corresponds to their net earnings in the previous
month from a full time job measured in thousands of polish zloty 14. The analysis is
based on real earnings using the national consumer price index 15.
Regional short-term unemployment rates (UR) and regional local annual hiring rates
(HR) are constructed from the LFS data. Normally, previous literature uses local
unemployment rates, which includes the long-term unemployed. The local short-term
unemployed are those that became unemployed during the year and are actively
searching for work as a percentage of the labor force. This study uses the regional local
short-term unemployment rate. This is a proxy for the annual (excessive) layoff rate
that drives the space of labor reallocation in the theoretical model. Regional hiring rates
are constructed by counting all individuals that have current job tenure less than a year
as a percentage of the labor force. These variables are summarized in Table 2. A wage
equation is described by the following specification,
lnWit ¼ β0 þ β1 lnSTURjt þ β2 lnHRjt þ β3Xit þ β4Dj þ β5Dt þ εit ð8Þ
The natural logarithm of individual i previous months real net earnings from a fulltime job, 16 Wit, in period t is explained by the natural logarithm of the regional short- term
unemployment rate, STURjt, and the regional annual hiring rate, HRjt. The paper controls
for non-linearity’s in age, work experience, education by category and sector dummies,
Xit, regional and time dummies, Dj, and Dt, respectively.
In Table 4 descriptive statistics are outlined for individual characteristics summarized
for those in the state of full time employment and non-employment. It is clear that a
slight majority have switched out of their planning job during transition. This varies
greatly across regions. The growth of the non-employment pool has been a big part of
transition. It is seen that older, less educated males with long spells in planning have
increasingly found themselves in non-employment during transition. The pace of this
also differs across regions, reflecting the speed of structural change in employment.
Table 5 reports results for an employed sample of males assuming random selection
17. In column I the responsiveness of individual wages to the local short-term un-
employment rate and local annual hiring rate is reported with only time dummies used
as additional variables. In columns II and III it is seen that the estimates are robust to
adding sector and region dummies.
In column IV controls are included for education 18. Years of schooling are not a
good control variable for education. Following the literature, the nature of education
under a communist regime turns out to be important. Flanagan (1994) using pre and
post-transition data for the Czech Republic, includes education in the form of categor-
ical variables, and finds a decrease in the rate of return to vocational education from
Table 4 Descriptive statistics
Employment Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Percentiles
10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Net Monthly Wage 26404 569.2 329.1 280 360.8 494.8 670.3 927.8
Age 26404 37 10.2 24 29 37 45 51
Work Experience 26404 11 10.8 1 3 7 17 26









Non- Employment Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Percentiles
10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Age 48800 44 20.2 17 23 44 61 71
Work Experience 38434 26 17.3 3 10 29 43 50
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0.39. Chase (1997) using similar data for the Czech Republic finds that the returns to
technical education/training greatly diminished while returns to academic education
experienced a large increase during transition. We see from column IV that returns to
education are higher for those that have more general or academic education compared
to those with narrow or technical training at each stage of schooling. This emphasizes
the need for categorical variables as controls for education.
In columns V and VI of Table 5 controls are included for age, with and without sector
dummies. Finally, in columns VII and VIII, the authors add controls for current job
tenure. Much of the work experience gained under communism by workers may not be
rewarded so well in a market economy. Younger age groups have less work experience
but any work experience accumulated, particularly during transition, may be highly
rewarded in the market economy. This allows for such a non-linearity in age and for a
flat experience and earning profile as documented for many other CEE countries 19.
The estimated short-term unemployment elasticity of pay, -0.29, and annual hiring rate
elasticity of pay, 0.75, remain even after including a rich set of individual controls.
Table 5 Wage regressions across polish individuals
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
R2 .08 .11 .19 .30 .33 .26 .40 .27
Constant 6.1 (23.3)* 6.5 (12.1)* 6.3 (11.6)* 6.2 (9.6)* 5.1 (8.3)* 4.9 (8.3)* 5.3 (8.6)* 5.3 (8.4)*
ln STU Rate -.29 (2.4)* -.29 (2.4)* -.28 (2.3)* -.29 (2.4)* -.29 (2.5)* -.29 (2.4)* -.29 (2.4)* -.29 (2.4)*
ln Hiring Rate .71 (4.2)* .71 (4.2)* .72 (4.2)* .73 (4.2)* .74 (4.3)* .74 (4.4)* .75 (4.3)* .76 (4.5)*
Age .07 (5.8)* .09 (4.3)* .05 (4.4)* .06 (3.8)*









Work Experience .02 (7.2)* .02 (6.16)*





Technical Training .03 (0.5) .03 (0.2) .01 (0.2) .01 (0.2) .01 (0.9)
Primary Education .06 (0.8) .10 (1.3) .14 (1.7) .10 (1.3) .13 (1.8)
Technical High
School
.18 (2.4)* .20 (2.7)* .24 (3.1)* .20 (2.6)* .23 (3.1)*
High School .21 (2.8)* .23 (3.12)* .27 (3.52)* .23 (3.0)* .26 (3.4)*
Technical College .24 (2.9)* .27 (3.4)* .24 (2.8)* .27 (3.3)* .24 (2.7)*
University .60 (8.0)* .61 (8.1)* .58 (7.4)* .61 (7.9)* .58 (7.4)*
Sector Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Regional Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 26,404 26,404 26,404 26,404 26,404 26,404 26,404 26,404
T-statistics in parenthesis, Assuming Random Selection 1994–1996.
* indicates significance at the 5% level.
* Robust Standard Errors, Number of clusters (regions) = 49.
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of (excessive) layoffs and hiring? Warsaw pays 31 per cent more, on average, than the
mean pay across all other regions during the period 1994–1996. In Table 6, using the
estimated short-term unemployment elasticity of pay and annual hiring rate elasticity of
pay the authors predict how much of this gap in average earnings, relative to Warsaw,
across regions is explained by log differences regional annual (excessive) layoffs and
hiring rates. While the effect varies from region to region, the pace of local labor demand
dynamics, on average, explains most of the differential in mean pay across regions. While
individual characteristics can determine participation rates and where one is on the wage
distribution within regions, the pace of local annual (excessive) layoffs and hiring rates are
shown to dictate the mean wage disparities across regions.
Conclusion
The Polish labor market in early transition was inhibited by the lack of inter-regional
worker and job flows and intra-region differences in the pace of employment restructuring.
Yet, these legacies of planning have allowed this research to study the importance of
regional labor demand dynamics on earnings, as outlined in Aghion and Blanchard (1994),
in an environment far less complex than that observed in mature market economies. While
individual characteristics are clearly important for determining labor force participation
Table 6 Decomposition of wage gaps (averaged over 1994–1996) relative to Warsaw:
estimated contribution of relative lnSTU rates and annual inhiring rates







Bialostockie 43.2 4.7 33.6 4.8
Bialskopodlaskie 32.4 8.8 25.1 −1.5
Bielskie 22.8 4.7 6.7 11.3
Bydgoskie 23.0 21.8 10.9 −9.7
Chelmskie 31.9 8.8 32.5 −9.4
Ciechanowskie 32.6 14.6 8.4 9.6
Czestochowskie 34.3 15.0 19.2 0.1
Elblaskie 32.1 17.6 −1.0 15.6
Gdanskie 10.6 9.7 0.8 0.1
Gorzowskie 27.8 27.8 −3.8 3.9
Jeleniogorskie 27.0 27.4 −4.4 4.0
Kaliskie 39.3 11.9 21.9 5.5
Katowickie 4.0 −3.1 25.7 −18.7
Kieleekie 37.0 11.2 29.2 −3.4
Koninskie 21.1 18.4 34.7 −32.0
Koszalinskie 34.6 33.4 −9.7 10.9
Krakowskie 22.3 2.2 19.6 0.5
Krosnienskie 43.1 12.0 20.1 11.0
Legnickie 20.6 16.9 26.7 −23.0
Leszezynskie 41.7 12.9 12.3 16.4
Lodzkie 22.7 7.9 28.2 −13.4
Lomzynskie 37.8 7.6 28.5 1.7
Lubelskie 29.2 22.0 9.7 −2.5
Nowosadeckie 44.7 12.1 22.5 10.1
Olsztynskie 33.1 25.9 4.6 2.6
Opolskie 19.2 7.4 13.8 −2.1
Ostroleckie 34.3 20.2 14.7 −0.5
Pilskie 32.1 21.5 4.2 6.3
Piotrkowskie 27.7 16.5 23.8 −12.6
Plockie 17.7 13.0 20.3 −15.6
Poznanskie 27.6 4.8 15.7 7.1
Premyskie 45.9 12.6 47.1 −13.8
Radomskie 36.2 14.8 29.3 −7.8
Rzeszowskie 39.4 11.0 13.8 14.6
Siedleckie 31.0 7.8 19.4 3.8
Sieradzkie 39.5 16.2 26.2 −2.9
Skierniewickie 35.1 5.1 18.5 11.5
Slupskie 34.3 38.3 0.4 −4.3
Suwalskie 28.0 32.3 19.4 −23.7
Szezecinskie 17.4 17.6 0.1 −0.4
Tarnobrzeskie 33.6 8.8 38.4 −13.6
Tarnowskie 36.3 7.2 15.1 14.0
Torunskie 28.8 20.8 13.2 −5.3
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Table 6 Decomposition of wage gaps (averaged over 1994–1996) relative to Warsaw:
estimated contribution of relative lnSTU rates and annual inhiring rates (Continued)
Walbrzyskie 37.1 25.2 16.7 −4.7
Warszawskie 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Wloclawskie 40.7 25.0 27.6 −11.9
Wroclawskie 20.4 11.1 −2.4 11.8
Zamojskie 43.0 5.7 26.3 11.0
Zielonogorskie 33.9 22.2 8.3 3.4
Average 30.4 14.6 16.6 −0.8
SD 9.88 8.83 12.41 11.02
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across regions are clearly dictated by the pace of regional employment restructuring. In
other words, differences in expected pay across regions are explained more by the pace
of structural change in labor demand and less by labor supply considerations. It is found
that structural change in employment has a first order effect on wages in a labor market
in early transition. The importance of an unemployment benefits and good infrastructure
for the private sector cannot be underestimated for an efficient worker reallocation path.
Endnotes
1 Worker reallocation referred to the movement of workers from the non-privatized
to the privatized sector. Since many privatized enterprises resisted restructuring, while
some state owned undertook restructuring this dichotomy is empirically problematic.
This has clearly been shown in the literature on firm performance and ownership; see
Walsh and Whelan (2001). Hence we work in terms of a non-restructured traditional
enterprises and restructured (traditional and de novo) enterprises dichotomy.
2 Exogenous (government imposed) restructuring can be replaced with a model of
endogenous (insider controlled) restructuring. To opt for restructuring, the expected
income from restructuring must compensate workers for the risk of becoming unemployed
and for their forgone income stream from the non-restructured state. Workers require a
wage premium for risk exposure during restructuring. With endogenous restructuring,
annual layoff and hiring rates can fuel wage pressure over an above that created by
exogenous government control of restructuring.
3 The assertion is that the need for structural change in employment is first order in a
labor market in transition. Traditional enterprises need to downsize and new enterprises
are needed to create outside options for job searchers. Pay is more about labor demand
dynamics and less about inherited human capital and participation considerations during
the transition period.
4 We examine wage behavior in an in-depth study of Poland’s regional experience. A
country study can miss important heterogeneity in regional labor demand dynamics.
Within a regional study of Poland over a relatively short time period, the data, the culture
and the macroeconomic institutions can be assumed to be similar across regions, while
the pace of structural change in labor demand varied greatly.
5 Boeri and Scarpetta (1996) document idiosyncratic initial conditions within regions
as the main reason for different speeds of regional employment restructuring during
transition.
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employees. There is missing data on the self-employed and part-time workers.
7This model of exogenous (government controlled) restructuring can be replaced
with a model of endogenous restructuring. During the reforms in 1990, majority insider
privatization ensured workers took control of firms. The following condition had to be
satisfied before workers would vote for restructuring, rVN ≤ λrVR +(1-λ) rVU. The
expected income stream for a worker, ex-post restructuring, must be at least as great as
the current income stream in the non-restructured state, rVN. A worker is given a
probability λ of remaining in the restructured firm, earning an income stream of rVR,
and a probability (1-λ) of becoming unemployed with an expected income stream of
rVU. The expected income stream after restructuring must compensate the worker for
the risk of becoming unemployed and for the forgone expected income stream from
the non-restructured state. One can write down the expected income stream in the
event of a flow into unemployment, rVU, and the expected income stream for a worker in
the non-restructured state, rVN. The minimum ex-post income stream, rVR, necessary to
induce an ex-ante vote for restructuring can be expressed as rVR = rVU + c/λ. Workers
require a premium for exposing themselves to the risk of becoming unemployed during
the restructuring process, as 0 < λ < 1. With endogenous restructuring, annual layoff and
hiring rates in restructured enterprises, can fuel wage pressure over an above that created
by exogenous government control of restructuring where λ = 1 .
8 This approach imposes exogenous mark-ups in the restructured product and labor
market. The explicit modeling of imperfections in product and labor markets can be
found in Konings and Walsh (1994, 2000) and Bughin (1996).
9 From the beginning of the 1970s, based on Adam Smith’s theory of “compensating
differentials” and a long-run zero migration equilibrium, Harris and Todaro (1970)
argued that regions with high unemployment should also experience high wage levels.
Hall (1970, 1972), Reza (1978), Adams (1985) and Marston (1985) find such a positive
relationship.
10 The macroeconomic models of Layard et al. (1991) and the microeconomic
efficiency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) are good examples of modeling
negatively related wage and unemployment outcomes with conventional labor demand
equations and imperfectly competitive wage setting behavior
11 This correlation refers to levels of unemployment and wages and not changes in
these variables found in a conventional regional Phillips curves.
12 As summarized by Blanchflower (2001), prior to his work only a small literature
estimated wage curves using individual micro data for Eastern Europe [for example
Kertese and Kallo (1997) for Hungary and Pannenberg and Schwarze (1998) for East
Germany].
13 Why these magnitudes in the unemployment elasticity of pay vary across countries,
by gender or by the measure of unemployment, can be debated, but will depend on the
model of imperfectly competitive wage setting one has in mind. There are many ways
to replace the conventional labor supply curve.
14 Some may like to see individual controls for the ownership structure of the firm.
In addition, one could have constructed excessive layoff rates for workers coming from
state firms and hiring rates for workers flowing into privatized firms. Since many privatized
enterprises resisted restructuring, while some state owned undertook restructuring this
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on firm performance and ownership; see Walsh and Whelan (2001). Hence we work in
terms of (excessive) layoffs and hiring rates in general expecting that they capture
ongoing restructuring of traditional enterprises and expansion of de novo enterprises.
15 A potential criticism of our work is that to measure real wages in different regions
one should have regional consumer price data. However, we do have regional dummies
in our regression equations to control for such an error.
16 Admittedly, part time workers and self-employed are excluded. On the plus side,
males in full time mainstream jobs are likely report earnings accurately.
17 The results are very similar when one employs a two step Heckman procedure.
18 Normally in mature market economies we would expect investment in human capital
to target high wage occupations. This selection bias is not a strong feature of this data as
most human capital and occupation structures were an outcome of the planning era. We
do not worry about instruments for education.
19 Flanagan (1994) finds that the return to work experience gained under planning
declined during the first few years of transition in the Czech Republic. Chase (1997)
using micro-data for the Czech Republic and Slovakia also finds that returns to work
experience fell during transition as young workers were favored in jobs created during
transition. Krueger and Pischke (1995) and Bird et al. (1994) for East Germany, Halpern
and Korosi (1997) for Hungary and Lehmann and Wadsworth (2000) for Russia and
Poland document very flat experience earning profiles. Return to experience gained
under planning clearly fell during transition.
Appendix
Annex I: 2-digit sector categories
Agriculture, fishing and forestry
 Forestry, logging and related service activities.
 Agriculture, hunting and related service activities.
 Fishing, operation of fish hacteries and fish farms.
Mining
 Mining & Extraction of coal and lignite, crude petroleum and natural gas, uranium
& thorium ores, metal ores.
 Other quarrying.
Manufacturing
 Food products & beverages
 Tobacco products
 Textiles, wearing apparel, tanning and dressing of leather, manufacture of luggage,
handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear.
 Wood, (and of products of wood and cork except furniture), pulp, paper and paper
products.
 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media.
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http://www.izajold.com/content/1/1/4 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel.
 Chemicals and chemical products.
 Rubber and plastic products.
 Other non-metallic mineral products.
 Basic metals.
 Machinery, & equipment , office machinery and computers, electrical machinery,
manufacture of medical, precision & optical instruments, watches and clocks.
 Manufacture of fabricated metal products.
 Manufacture of motor vechicles & other transport equipment.
 Other manufacturing: including manufacture of furniture, and recycling.
Electricity, gas and water supply




Wholesale & retail trade
 Retail & wholesale trade, repair of household and personal goods.
Hotels & restaurants
 Hotels and restaurants.
Transport storage and communication
 Land transport, water transport, air transport, cargo handling and storage, other
supporting transport activities, activities of transport agencies.
Financial intermediation.
 Financial intermediation, insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social
security, activities auxiliary to financial intermediation.
 Real estate activities, renting of machinery and equipment.
Public administration and defense
 Public administration and defense.
Education
 Education.
Health & social work
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Other services
 Other Community, social and personal service activities Sewage & refuse disposal,
sanitation, recreational , cultural and sporting activities, other service activities, Private
households with employed persons.
 Private Households With Employed Persons.
 Extra-territorial organisations and bodies.
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